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The rapid rise of Chinese companies in the global economy 
has attracted great scholarly attention to Chinese corporate 
governance.  Among the various areas of Chinese corporate 
governance, executive compensation is an important yet difficult 
part to research.  The common research method of the Chinese 
executive pay literature relies on pay figures disclosed in listed 
companies’ annual reports and tends to take the disclosed numbers 
at face value.  This Article discusses three informal pay practices 
that constrain the usefulness and reliability of executive pay data 
formally disclosed in annual reports of Chinese-listed companies, 
especially those owned by the state.  A valid reading of formal pay 
figures entails an understanding of the network structure and the 
political environment in which Chinese companies operate.  An 
investigation of the practices behind formal compensation numbers 
sheds light on many issues for scholars and policymakers, the 
salience of which escalates as the international interaction with 
Chinese companies expands.  For example, it stresses the important 
role of political institutions in shaping executive compensation; 
raises questions about the extent to which international cross-listing 
improves transparency of Chinese companies; critically evaluates 
whether China’s latest reform policy deals with the real problems of 
its state-owned enterprises; and spotlights the lacuna of extant 
scholarship on Chinese executive compensation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
China now ranks second behind the United States in the 
number of the world’s largest 2,000 public corporations on the 
Forbes list.1  The rapid rise of Chinese companies in the global 
economy has drawn great scholarly attention to Chinese corporate 
governance.  However, scholars of comparative corporate 
governance often observe significant limits of using standard 
theories or Western experience to understand Chinese companies.  
Among the various areas of Chinese corporate governance, 
executive compensation is an important yet difficult part to research.  
As the Economist aptly noted years ago, “[h]ow executives are 
rewarded is one of the many mysteries of China’s increasingly 
powerful companies.  Unravelling it is important, not least because 
it should help to explain corporate China’s transformation from a 
state-controlled to a consumer-driven creature.”2 
                                                                                                               
 1 The Forbes Global 2000 is an annual ranking of the world’s top 2,000 public 
companies by Forbes Magazine.  The ranking is based on a combination of four metrics: 
sales, profit, assets and market value.  In 2016, the U.S. leads the list with 579 companies, 
followed by China (mainland and Hong Kong) with 232.  Chinese companies own the top 
four spots and split the top ten spots with U.S companies.  For the full list, see The World’s 
Biggest Public Companies, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/#tab:overall 
[https://perma.cc/2PQM-FM83] (last visited Nov. 10, 2016). 
 2 Executive Compensation in China: False Options, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 4, 2008), 
http://www.economist.com/node/12070705 [https://perma.cc/NW3Y-C77U]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss2/2
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In the past decade, a growing body of literature has tried to 
bring Chinese executive pay practices to light.  Most studies of 
Chinese executive pay follow the conventional approach of Western 
compensation literature: taking the publicly-listed firm as the unit of 
observation, focusing on the listed firm’s pay figures disclosed in 
the annual report, and regressing the dependent variable of the 
disclosed pay amount on a set of independent variables, such as 
revenues, profits, ownership type, etc. 3   This typical approach 
produces useful insights, to be sure, yet it is an under-contextualized 
approach to studying Chinese companies, particularly the state-
controlled firms.  The approach overlooks the fact that a Chinese-
listed firm often is a member of a corporate group in which there are 
frequent intra-group transactions and personnel overlaps among 
member companies.  The incentive systems of group-affiliated firms 
may be different from those of typical stand-alone firms considered 
in the Western executive pay literature.4  Moreover, this common 
approach relying on corporate annual reports assumes that China 
has effective enforcement of securities regulations and Chinese 
companies have a culture of compliance and truthful disclosure.  
This assumption should be accepted with caution.  Chinese public 
companies and even the government have a notorious reputation of 
data manipulation. 5   Big accounting firms in China have been 
                                                                                                               
 3 See Section II (The Numbers Scrutinized in the Spotlight) for the review of this 
empirical literature. 
 4 For literature on Chinese corporate groups showing how group affiliation affects 
affiliated firm’s financial performance and behavior, see LISA A. KEISTER, CHINESE 
BUSINESS GROUPS: THE STRUCTURE AND IMPACT OF INTERFIRM RELATIONS DURING 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2000) (discussing Chinese interfirm relations); Michael Carney 
et al., Business Group Performance in China: Ownership and Temporal Considerations, 5 
MGMT. & ORG. REV. 167 (2009) (discussing whether group affiliation can improve firm 
performance). 
 5 See Francine McKenna, After China Fraud Boom, Nasdaq Steps up Scrutiny of 
Shady Listings, MARKET WATCH (June 20, 2016), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/
after-china-fraud-boom-nasdaq-steps-up-scrutiny-of-shady-listings-2016-06-20 [https://
perma.cc/Q28E-ZFAU] (reporting that “more than 50 U.S. listed Chinese companies were 
either delisted or halted from trading in 2011 and 2012 based on claims of fraud and other 
violations of U.S. securities laws”); Johnathan Chew, China Officials Admit They Fake 
Economic Figures, FORTUNE (Dec. 14, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/12/14/china-fake-
economic-data/ [https://perma.cc/9SBB-53W3] (discussing the untrue economic data 
reported in China); Whether to Believe China’s GDP Figures, ECONOMIST (July 15, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/07/chinese-economy [https://perma.
cc/3RCV-NRS5] (discussing the issues of China’s reporting of its GDP); Nina Xiang, 
Accounting Fraud Is Still Widespread Among Chinese Companies, FORBES (April 16, 
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ninaxiang/2014/04/16/accounting-fraud-is-still-
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embroiled in scandals involving accounting fraud.6  As Professor 
Donald Clarke notes, “the reality of corporate governance practices 
in China remains very different from what appears in the statute 
books, and indeed so opaque that it is difficult to measure reliably 
where it is, let alone in what direction it is moving.”7  It suggests 
nontrivial limits of using the standard methodology to capture the 
true picture of executive compensation in China. 
This Article focuses on three common practices that 
constrain the usefulness and reliability of executive pay data 
disclosed in Chinese-listed companies’ annual reports: on-duty 
consumption, zero compensation, and nominal versus actual pay.  In 
particular, this Article collects data to show the striking yet 
overlooked zero-pay puzzle presented in Chinse listed companies’ 
annual reports, where a considerably large proportion of board 
members of Chinese-listed firms do not earn any compensation paid 
by the listed companies that they serve.  To the best of this author’s 
knowledge, this is the first systematic analysis of the zero-pay 
puzzle in extant scholarship.  These three compensation practices 
lurking behind the formal numbers must be understood against a 
backdrop of slack regulation and corporate group structures being 
used to support the interests of the Chinese state-owner.  China’s 
current securities regulations give listed companies freedom to 
mystify their top management compensation practices through the 
pervasive personnel linkages in a corporate group.  The 
mystification particularly serves the interests of the state-owner, 
who has been unwilling to relinquish control over the personnel of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
These three compensation practices raise concerns about 
data comparability and reliability of Chinese-listed companies’ 
annual reports.  As shown in this Article, the data problems are not 
alleviated by cross-listing in better disclosure regimes, such as the 
stock exchanges of the United States and Hong Kong.  These 
                                                                                                               
widespread-among-chinese-companies/#2eb89f88723e [https://perma.cc/8R8A-6ZWE] 
(discussing accounting fraud in Chinese companies). 
 6 See Press Release, Securities and Exchange Comm’n (SEC), SEC Imposes 
Sanctions Against China-Based Members of Big Four Accounting Networks for Refusing 
to Produce Documents (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-
25.html [https://perma.cc/49SK-N2TM] (discussing SEC’s investigation of accounting 
fraud in Chinese companies). 
 7 Donald Clarke, “Nothing But Wind”?: The Past and Future of Comparative 
Corporate Governance, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 75, 101–02 (2010). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss2/2
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informal pay practices also raise questions about whether executives 
of China’s listed firms are capable of discharging their fiduciary 
duties to the listed firms they serve. 
Furthermore, observing the pay practices behind the formal 
numbers published in corporate annual reports offers a nuanced 
view on the perennial scholarly debate about the trajectory of 
national corporate governance systems in the age of globalization.  
It suggests that politics play an important role in the formal rules 
and actual practices of executive compensation.  It also offers an 
insightful perspective to evaluate China’s recent SOE reform 
agenda. 
In China, the term “executives” or “top managers” (gaoguan) 
usually includes directors, supervisors, the general manager (CEO), 
deputy general managers (vice CEOs), the financial officer, the 
corporate secretary, and others described in the articles of 
incorporation.  This common usage considers the fact that directors 
and supervisors are usually corporate senior managers. 8   To be 
consistent with China’s common usage, “executive compensation” 
referred in this Article includes compensation for directors, 
supervisors, and other top managers. 
This Article is organized as follows.  Section I will set out 
the existing regulatory framework of executive compensation China.  
It helps explain how the formal regulations make the mystification 
of executive pay possible.  Section II will review existing scholarly 
studies of Chinese executive compensation to show what sorts of 
pay information are typically examined in existing literature.  
Section III will discuss three informal pay practices that render 
compensation information disclosed in the corporate annual report 
significantly incomplete or misleading.  Finally, Section IV 
discusses theoretical and policy implications, as well as questions 
for future research. 
I. THE FORMAL RULES OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
Executive compensation in China is regulated by four legal 
sources: the company law, securities regulations for listed 
companies, special rules for financial institutions, and rules for 
                                                                                                               
 8 Lin Lin, Regulating Executive Compensation in China: Problems and Solutions, 32 
J.L. & COM. 207, 212 (adopting the same definition of “executives” in the Chinese context). 
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state-controlled firms.  An overview of the legal sources provides a 
backdrop to understand how actual compensation practices deviate 
from the formal rules and how the formal rules play a role in 
concealing actual practices. 
A. The Company Law 
China’s 2006 Company Law is the fundamental legal source 
of Chinese corporate governance.  A major governance feature 
under China’s corporate law is the dual board structure, which 
consists of the board of directors and the board of supervisors.  
Figure 1 below shows the governance structure under China’s 
corporate law.  The function of the board of directors is similar to 
the board in the Anglo-American corporate system.  The board of 
directors is responsible for managing the corporation’s business and 
affairs, including the appointment of senior officers and the 
determination of their compensation.  The board of supervisors is 
responsible for supervising directors and senior officers in 
performing their duties.  Both boards are elected by shareholders, 
who are entitled to receive periodic disclosure of executive 
compensation paid by the company and have the authority to 
approve the compensation of directors and supervisors at the general 
shareholder meeting.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                               
 9 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa ( ) [Company 
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) art. 38, 47 [hereinafter Company 
Law]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss2/2
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Figure 1.  Governance Structure under China’s Company Law 
 
 
 
B. Securities Regulations for Listed Companies 
The China Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is 
the main government agency overseeing listed companies in China.  
CSRC’s Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 
(2002) suggests that a listed company may establish the 
compensation committee to study and review the company’s 
remuneration policies for directors and senior officers.10  It also 
suggests that the board of directors should disclose compensation 
information to shareholders.  In the early 1990s, China’s securities 
regulations already required listed companies to disclose executive 
compensation in their annual reports, but most listed companies did 
not comply with the rules.11  In 1999, CSRC promulgated a new 
rule that required the listed company to disclose in its annual report 
the lump sum of compensation paid to its directors, supervisors, and 
senior officers.  The company was also required to list all the 
directors, supervisors and senior officers who did not receive 
                                                                                                               
 10 Company Law art. 52, 56, supra note 9; Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze (
) [Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China] (promulgated 
by China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n and State Econ. and Trade Comm’n, Jan. 7, 2002). 
 11 Gupiao Faxing yu Jiaoyi Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli ( ) 
[Provisional Administrative Regulations on Stock Issuance and Trading] (promulgated by 
Decree No. 112 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Apr. 22, 1993, 
effective as of the same date) art. 59. 
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compensation from the company.12  While this disclosure rule had 
no compliance problems, the lump sum approach provided very 
limited information to understand each individual executive’s 
compensation. 
The compensation disclosure rules were amended in 2001.13  
The 2001 amendment required disclosure of executive pay policies.  
Moreover, instead of lumping directors’, supervisors’, and senior 
officers’ compensation together, the rules required the listed 
company to disclose the sum of the top three paid directors and the 
sum of the top three paid officers, respectively.  Independent 
directors’ compensation should be disclosed on an individual basis.  
The listed company was required to list executives who did not 
receive any compensation from the company and indicated whether 
or not they received any pay from its shareholders or subsidiaries.  
This disclosure rule implied that top managers were allowed to be 
paid by the listed company’s shareholders or affiliates, rather than 
by the listed company itself.  Yet, the amount of compensation paid 
by the listed company’s affiliates was not subject to disclosure. 
In 2005, CSRC amended the disclosure rules, resulting in 
mandatory disclosure of each executive’s compensation. 14   The 
disclosure scheme included two parts: total compensation and 
current equity holdings.  Total compensation is the sum of base 
salary, bonuses, subsidies, employee benefits, insurance, and other 
forms of compensation paid by the company.  The rules maintained 
the position that the listed company should list executives who did 
not receive any pay from the company and indicate whether they 
                                                                                                               
 12 Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Gongsi Xinxi Pilu de Neirong yu Geshi Zhunze Dierhao 
<Niandu Baogao de Neirong yu Geshi> (
< >) [Public Companies’ Disclosure Content and Format 
Rules No. 2 <Content and Format of Annual Reports>] (promulgated by China Sec. 
Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 8, 1999). 
 13 Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Gongsi Xinxi Pilu de Neirong yu Geshi Zhunze Dierhao 
<Niandu Baogao de Neirong yu Geshi> (
< >) [Public Companies’ Disclosure Content and Format 
Rules No. 2 <Content and Format of Annual Reports>] (promulgated by China Sec. 
Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 8, 1999, amended by China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 10, 
2001) art. 26. 
 14 Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Gongsi Xinxi Pilu de Neirong yu Geshi Zhunze Dierhao 
<Niandu Baogao de Neirong yu Geshi> (
< >) [Public Companies’ Disclosure Content and Format 
Rules No. 2 <Content and Format of Annual Reports>] (promulgated by China Sec. 
Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 8, 1999, amended by China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 26, 
2005) art. 26. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss2/2
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received compensation from the company’s shareholders or 
subsidiaries.  Still, the amount of compensation paid by the 
company’s affiliates remained undisclosed.  The most current 
disclosure rules (released in 2016) are virtually the same as the rules 
of 2005.15 
C. Rules for Financial Institutions 
In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, the 
Chinese government tightened its control over executive 
compensation of the financial sector, which has been dominated by 
SOEs.  In 2009, the Ministry of Finance placed a pay cap at RMB 
2.8 million (approximately U.S. $410 thousand)16 for executives at 
state-controlled financial institutions and promulgated rules to 
strengthen the link between pay and performance.  The China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) also published guidelines 
to regulate executive pay practices of China’s financial institutions 
(including policy banks, commercial banks, financial assets 
management companies, financial cooperatives, and finance 
companies), whether state-owned or not. 17   According to the 
guidelines, the structure of executive compensation should include 
fixed salary, variable pay (i.e., performance-oriented compensation 
and short-term and long-term incentives), and benefits (e.g. housing 
subsidies).  The guidelines set out details of executive compensation 
management.  For instance, the base salary should be no more than 
35% of the total compensation, and 40% of the performance bonus 
should be paid on a deferral basis with the deferral period not less 
than three years.  Financial institutions that fail to comply with the 
guidelines would be subject to sanctions imposed by CBRC. 
                                                                                                               
 15 Gongkai Faxing Gupiao Gongsi Xinxi Pilu de Neirong yu Geshi Zhunze Dierhao 
<Niandu Baogao de Neirong yu Geshi> (
< >) [Public Companies’ Disclosure Content and Format 
Rules No. 2 <Content and Format of Annual Reports>] (promulgated by China Sec. 
Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 8, 1999, amended by China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 9, 
2016) art. 53. 
 16 The exchange rate of USD to Renminbi as of Dec. 31, 2009 was 1:6.828.  Historic 
Exchange Rates, X-RATES, http://www.x-rates.com/historical/?from=USD&amount=1&
date=2009-12-31 [https://perma.cc/2RRQ-6397] (last visited Mar. 1, 2017). 
 17 Shangye Yinhang Wenjian Xinchou Jianguan Zhiyin (
) [Supervision Guidelines on Healthy Compensation of Commercial Banks], 
(promulgated by China Banking Regulatory Comm’n, Feb. 21, 2010). 
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D. Rules for Non-Financial SOEs 
At present, China’s largest non-financial SOEs are 
controlled by the central or local government’s ownership agency, 
known as the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC).  The large non-financial SOEs under 
SASAC’s control are typically organized as vertically-integrated 
business groups.  Figure 2 illustrates the organizational structure of 
a typical business group under SASAC’s control. 18   The parent 
company typically is 100% owned by SASAC.  Beneath the parent 
company are a large number of subsidiaries, including listed firms, 
finance companies, research institutes, and many other related firms 
along the production chain.  Often, there are frequent business 
transactions and personnel overlaps among member firms in a group. 
 
Figure 2. Typical Structure of a Non-Financial State-Owned 
Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SASAC is authorized by the State-Owned Enterprise Assets 
Act (a special law outside the company law) to determine 
managerial compensation of the companies under its direct control, 
                                                                                                               
 18 See Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions: 
Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697 (2013) 
(discussing in detail the organization and governance of the business groups under 
SASAC’s control). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss2/2
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i.e., the parent company in Figure 2.19  Since its establishment in 
2003, SASAC, in cooperation with relevant government and party 
organs, has introduced a series of measures to reform the parent 
company’s executive compensation practices. 20   Some important 
measures include: managerial compensation structure consisting of 
base salary, bonus, and mid-term and long-term incentives that are 
linked with corporate performance; executive pay pegged to an 
average worker’s pay at certain fixed rate; 21  and using a 
sophisticated formula to determine the pay level based on a set of 
economic, social, environmental and political indicators.22 
Recently, the government’s anti-corruption campaign has 
escalated the SOE pay reform.  In 2014, the Political Bureau of the 
Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee, presided by 
President Xi Jinping, passed a set of rules to reform SOE executive 
pay.23  Top managers (including directors, supervisors, CEOs and 
                                                                                                               
 19 Qiye Guoyou Zichan Fa ( ) [State-Owned Enterprise Assets Act] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2008, effective May 1, 
2009), ch. 4. 
 20 Such regulations are usually promulgated jointly with the Central Organization 
Department of the Chinese Communist Party (i.e., the Party’s human resources 
department), the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, the Ministry of 
Finance, National Audit Office, the Ministry of Supervision and SASAC. 
 21 According to SASAC’s 2009 guidelines, base salaries should not be more than five 
times of SOEs’ average worker’s pay in prior year and performance bonuses should not be 
more than three times of base salaries; in other words, the total compensation including 
base salaries and performance bonuses should be no more than twenty times the amount of 
the SOEs’ average worker’s pay.  The original text of the guidelines was never published 
to the public.  However, a summary and inside information is available in the People’s 
Daily, an official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party.  Pay for Senior SOE 
Executives Capped at 20 Times Average Employee Pay, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Sept. 25, 2009), 
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/10113071.html [https://perma.cc/9686-Y6LQ] 
(discussing Guanyu Jinyibu Guifan Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Xinchou Guanli de Zhidao 
Yijian ( ) [Guidelines Concerning 
Further Regulating Executive Compensation of the Central State-Owned Enterprises] 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, the Chinese 
Communist Party Central Organization Department, the Ministry of Supervision, the 
Ministry of Finance, the National Audit Office, and SASAC, Sept. 16, 2009)). 
 22 Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Jingying Yeji Kaohe Zanxing Banfa (
) [Provisional Measures on the Comprehensive Evaluation of Top 
Managers of the Central State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated by SASAC, Dec. 29, 
2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 23 Zhongyang Guanli Qiye Fuzeren Xinchou Zhidu Gaige Fangan (
) [Reform Scheme on Executive Compensation of the Central 
State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated by the Central Politburo of the Communist Party 
of China, Aug. 29, 2014, effective Jan. 1, 2015); Guanyu Heli Queding bing Yange Guifan 
Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Lvzhi Daiyu, Yewu Zhichu de Yijian (
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vice CEOs) of the SOEs directly owned by SASAC (i.e. the parent 
company in Figure 2) are subject to the new rules. 24   The 
government’s reform statement reaffirms the use of performance-
oriented pay and prohibits illegal financial income.25 
E. Evaluation 
The brief overview of China’s executive compensation rules 
shows that government intervention is quite direct and pervasive.  
Mandatory disclosure, a common form of government intervention 
in executive compensation, indeed exists in China.  But the depth of 
information disclosure is relatively limited compared to the 
disclosure standards in advanced capital markets, such as the United 
States.  Disclosure of each executive’s compensation was not 
required until 2005.  Still, the scope of executive compensation 
remains vague and it does not require disclosure of a breakdown of 
compensation composition.  This raises questions about 
comparability of compensation data across companies in China. 
Another problem involves the fact that executives may 
receive compensation only from the shareholders or subsidiaries of 
the listed company, not the listed company itself.  The regulations 
only require the listed company to disclose “whether or not” 
executives receive pay from its affiliates.  The amount of 
compensation actually paid by the listed company’s affiliates is not 
subject to the disclosure requirements.  Section III will empirically 
show that the business group structure coupled with this regulatory 
slack lead to the zero-pay phenomenon, significantly masking the 
actual compensation practices in China. 
The most silent form of government intervention is that the 
state itself directly determines the pay level in SOEs.  As discussed 
above, the government has imposed a maximum amount of 
                                                                                                               
) [Opinions on Rationalizing and Strictly 
Regulating Position-Related Treatments and Business-Related Expenses of Top Managers 
of the Central State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated by the Central Politburo of the 
Communist Party of China, Aug. 29, 2014). 
 24 While the rules are applicable to the SOEs under SASAC’s control, the government 
explicitly encouraged all central and local SOEs adopt similar rules.  As a result, many 
local governments recently have taken similar steps to curb executive pay at their SOEs. 
 25 While a brief summary of the pay reform policy has been released by the 
government, until today the full text of the rules has not been released. 
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executive compensation on SOEs.  Moreover, under the State-
Owned Enterprise Assets Act, the state-owner grants itself the 
power to determine not only directors’ compensation, but also 
compensation of senior officers, such as CEOs and vice CEOs.  In 
other words, the state-owner has a super control right that is not 
available under corporate law, under which shareholders have 
authority to determine director remuneration yet the board of 
directors approves compensation for senior officers. 
In fact, the state-owner not only legitimizes its intervention 
through the State-Owned Enterprise Assets Act—its involvement is 
more penetrating than what it appears to be on the face of the law.  
As Section III will show, SASAC’s compensation power effectively 
reaches down to the listed subsidiaries, rather than being restricted 
to the parent company as stated in the law.  By leveraging the 
complex corporate group structure and complementary disclosure 
rules, the state-owner effectively conceals actual SOE compensation 
practices notwithstanding mandatory disclosure of each executive’s 
compensation paid by the listed firm. 
II. THE NUMBERS SCRUTINIZED IN THE SPOTLIGHT 
Empirical analysis is essential in understanding executive 
compensation.  Without compensation data, it is impossible to 
symmetrically observe pay levels, composition, and the relationship 
between pay and performance.  Both Western and Chinese 
executive pay literature mainly use empirical methods to analyze 
executive remuneration data.  As discussed in Section I, starting in 
1999, China’s listed companies began to disclose the amount of 
compensation paid to the three highest-paid directors and the 
amount of compensation paid to the three highest-paid senior 
officers.  Starting in 2005, companies should disclose in their annual 
report the amount of compensation paid to each director, supervisor 
and senior officer.  These disclosure rules triggered the takeoff of 
Chinese executive pay research. 
Existing Chinese executive pay literature, both in Chinese 
and English, typically concerns two related empirical questions: 
whether there is a positive relationship between pay and firm 
performance; and if so, what the determinants of pay-performance 
sensitivity are.  The existing studies tend to find a positive 
relationship between executive pay and performance, while 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
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significance and magnitude of the positive linkage vary with 
performance measures and sample periods.  Often, studies 
investigate how corporate governance attributes such as ownership 
concentration, ownership identity (e.g., state-owned or not), and 
board structure (e.g. board size, number of independent directors) 
affect the pay level and pay-performance sensitivity, and the results 
seem inconclusive.26 
Regardless of their research questions, all such studies need 
to measure executive compensation.  This Article focuses on the 
studies published in English-language scholarly journals.  A 
summary of pay variables and data periods in major English-
language studies of Chinese executive compensation is provided in 
the Appendix.  The summary is not intended to serve as a 
comprehensive literature review but to show existing studies’ 
common approaches to measuring executive compensation. 
As shown in the Appendix, early studies relied on survey 
data to examine Chinese SOEs’ executive compensation practices in 
the 1980s.  The sample companies in these early studies were non-
listed companies because China’s stock exchanges had not been 
established until the early 1990s.  All of the other studies focus on 
listed firms, and their study periods start from 1999 or later, due to 
data made available under mandatory compensation disclosure.  
Most of the existing studies focus on cash compensation (i.e. salary 
and bonus) rather than equity, as Chinese-listed firms rarely use 
equity incentives.  The pay variable of studies covering the years 
prior to 2005 is typically measured as the sum or the average of the 
three highest-paid senior officers or directors; the pay variable of 
studies that focus on 2005 or after use individual executive pay.  
This measurement pattern reflects data availability under the 
disclosure rules. 
Most of the studies included in the Appendix focus on cash 
compensation, while only a few studies examine perquisites.  
Perquisites typically include housing subsidies, travel 
reimbursement, entertainment expenses, etc.  The limited 
investigation of perquisites is due to the fact that Chinese-listed 
companies are not required to disclose such information. 
No matter how scholars measure executive compensation 
(cash, equity, or perks), they typically take the listed firm as a stand-
                                                                                                               
 26 See infra Appendix. 
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alone unit of analysis.  Executive compensation is analyzed as an 
outcome of the listed firm’s internal governance, such as the 
percentage of independent directors on the board, chairman-CEO 
duality, the existence of compensation committee, or shareholder 
identity (e.g. state or non-state). 
Overall, empirical studies focus on cash compensation 
disclosed in corporate annual reports.  While this approach produces 
insights, there remain great limitations of understanding actual 
managerial compensation practices of Chinese-listed companies.  
As Section III will show, there are simultaneously under-, over-, and 
non-reporting problems in Chinese-listed firms’ executive 
compensation disclosure.  The numbers disclosed in the corporate 
annual report should be taken cautiously, rather than at their face 
value. 
III. THE PRACTICES HIDDEN IN THE SHADOW 
This section analyzes three disclosure practices peculiar to 
Chinese ownership structure and compensation regulations that 
mask actual executive pay of Chinese-listed companies, particularly 
state-controlled firms.  The first practice is the non-disclosure of 
perks, or so-called “on-duty consumption.”  The second practice is 
the zero-compensation phenomenon where a large number of 
directors and supervisors do not receive any compensation from the 
listed company they serve.  The third practice concerns the gap 
between actual and nominal pay.  Because some existing studies 
have recognized on-duty consumption, this Article will give a brief 
discussion of its institutional causes.  Attention will be focused on 
the other two practices that are overlooked in the extant literature.   
A. On-Duty Consumption 
On-duty consumption (zaizhi xiaofei) is an important source 
of income for Chinese SOE executives.  It involves various benefits 
enjoyed as a result of one’s position.  Typical benefits include 
housing allowance, personal use of corporate cars, shopping 
vouchers, travel expenses, and entertainment expenditures.  The true 
amount of perk consumption is difficult to estimate because China’s 
listed companies are not required to disclose such information.  
Even when disclosed, perk consumption is likely underreported or 
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significantly obscured.  A conservative estimate suggested that 
perks could range between 15% and 32% of the total executive 
compensation in China.27  Another study suggested that the average 
managerial perks could be as high as eight times the average cash 
pay.28 
Despite the significance of perks in Chinese executive 
compensation, very few studies focus on them because of a lack of 
data.  Chinese-listed companies are not required to disclose 
information on executive perks.  Less than 50% of the listed firms 
voluntarily disclosed such expenses. Even when they did, the 
disclosed information was in a lump-sum format, where outsiders 
could not distinguish legitimate corporate operating expenses from 
managerial personal benefits.29  Therefore, most scholars focus on 
observable data (i.e., salary and bonus) rather than the unobservable 
(i.e., perks). 
The use of on-duty compensation in SOEs traces back to the 
traditional compensation system.  Before the economic reform 
starting in the 1980s, all enterprises were state-owned and managers’ 
compensation was subject to the civil service pay system.  The 
system was based on egalitarianism, in which there were little salary 
differentials between ordinary workers and high-rank employees.30  
Yet government employees above a certain rank could receive 
considerable rank-specific perks.  While in 1985 the SOE pay 
system was separate from the government pay system, on-duty 
consumption remains as a significant hidden pay component for 
SOE executives.  Because on-duty consumption is off-sheet income 
and subject to little monitoring, it has been criticized as a major 
source of corruption in the SOE system.  The Chinese government 
very recently in the anti-corruption campaign made high-profile 
regulations to restrain the abuse of on-duty consumption in the 
                                                                                                               
 27 Takao Kato & Cheryl Long, Executive Compensation, Firm Performance and 
Corporate Governance in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, 54 ECON. DEV. AND CULTURAL CHANGE 945, 961 (2006). 
 28 Donghua Chen et al., Do Managers Perform for Perks?, SSRN (Mar. 1, 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562003 [https://perma.cc/CF8P-4VYP]. 
 29 Martin J. Conyon et al., Organizational Slack, CEO Turnover and the Horizon 
Problem in China, SSRN (Mar. 10, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2355744 [https://perma.cc/Q79S-HMNB], n. 3 (arguing the limits of using 
voluntarily disclosed perk-related expenditures to estimate the true amount of perks). 
 30 See Hon S. Chan, How Are They Paid? A Study of Civil Service Pay in China, 77 
INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 294 (2011) (discussing China’s civil pay system). 
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SOEs.  The regulatory rules limit the scope of on-duty consumption 
to certain qualified expenditures.31  The effects of the recent rules 
are questionable, given that similar regulations have already been in 
place for a decade.32 
Critically speaking, the government’s existing reform of on-
duty consumption has only scratched the surface of the problem.  
The fundamental problem of on-duty consumption lies not in 
extravagant expenditures, but in the government’s (specifically the 
Chinese Communist Party’s) unwillingness to release its control 
over SOE personnel.  This author’s previous work has shown that 
the Chinese government frequently rotates people between 
government bureaus and SOEs to control the management of 
SOEs. 33   The common personnel linkages inevitably make 
government officials a group of peers for SOE executives.  As a 
result, an SOE executive’s pay is implicitly benchmarked against 
the pay of a government official of equivalent rank, whose pay 
structure has a very low salary but considerable perks. 34   As 
mentioned above, the amount of on-duty consumption is rank-
specific, depending on one’s administrative rank (xingzheng jibie) in 
the government system.  For example, ministers enjoy the perks of 
the ministerial level.  Since 1999, the Chinese government has made 
several regulatory attempts to abandon administrative rank for SOEs, 
but the rules have been effectively disregarded.35  For example, the 
                                                                                                               
 31 Guanyu Heli Queding bing Yange Guifan Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Lvzhi Daiyu, 
Yewu Zhichu de Yijian (
) [Opinions on Rationalizing and Strictly Regulating Position-Related 
Treatments and Business-Related Expenses of Top Managers of the Central State-Owned 
Enterprises] (promulgated by the Central Politburo of the Communist Party of China, Aug. 
29, 2014).  In the Opinions, position-related treatments include the use of corporate 
vehicles, corporate housing, and training (including training at the Chinese Communist 
Party School and administrative academy but explicitly excluding MBA or EMBA tuition).   
Business-related expenses include expenses for customer entertainment, travel, and 
telecommunication. 
 32 Guanyu Guifan Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Zhiwu Xiaofei de Zhidao Yijian (
) [Guidelines on On-Duty Consumption of Top 
Managers of the Central State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated by SASAC, Jun. 8, 2006, 
effective Jan. 1, 2007). 
 33 Li-Wen Lin, State Ownership and Corporate Governance in China: An Executive 
Career Approach, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 743, 743 (2013) (investigating the career 
paths of CEOs at Chinese SOEs and finding that generally more than 20% of CEOs spent 
some time in government bureaus before their CEO appointments). 
 34 Chan, supra note 30, at 302. 
 35 The 15th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party passed a resolution to 
abandon administrative ranks for enterprises and their top managers.  Guanyu Guoyou 
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largest five state-owned banks and the largest three state-owned oil 
companies hold vice-ministerial rank in the government system.36  
The use of administrative rank in SOEs allows a unified career 
platform for government officials and SOE managers.  It efficiently 
interprets the meaning of a transfer (promotion, lateral move or 
demotion) and associated benefits for a rotation between SOEs and 
other government units.  While the legal pay of an SOE executive is 
higher than that of an equivalent-rank official, it is significantly 
lower than that of executives of privately-owned or foreign 
enterprises, another peer group for compensation determination.  
This sharp pay gap might instigate a feeling of unfairness and 
prompt SOE executives to unscrupulously extract personal benefits 
from covert on-duty consumption.  As opposed to the clandestine 
                                                                                                               
Qiye Gaige he Fazhan Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding (
) [Resolution on Several Important Questions Concerning SOE Reform 
and Development] (promulgated by the 15th Cent. Comm. of the Communist Party of 
China, Sept. 22, 1999).  In 2000, the State Council also issued a notice to abandon 
administrative ranks for SOEs.  However, the government decisions were not actually 
implemented.  This was also true for listed SOEs.  In 2006, the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
conducted a survey of the SOEs listed on the stock exchange to investigate whether the 
executives retained any administrative rank.  The result showed that about 60% of 
executives of the listed central SOEs retained administrative rank.  See SHANGHAI 
ZHENGQUAN JIAOYISUO YANJIU ZHONGXIN ( ) [SHANGHAI STOCK 
EXCHANGE RESEARCH CENTER], ZHONGGUO GONGSI ZHILI BAOGAO (2006): GUOYOU 
KONGGU SHANGSHI GONGSI ZHILI ( (2006): ) 
[CHINA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT (2006): THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE 
HOLDING LISTED COMPANIES] (2006).  Very recent news reports also suggest that 
administrative rank remains a living institution in SOEs.  See Nie Huihua ( ), 
Zhongguo Guanyuan Jibie de Zhengzhi Luoji ( ) [The Political 
Logic of Chinese Government Officials’ Administrative Rank], FIN. TIMES (CHINESE) (Sept. 
8, 2015), http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001063796?full=y [https://perma.cc/683G-
XDNQ] (discussing different political rankings in China); Hanshue Suo ( ), Guozi 
Gaoguan Diaoyan: Chao 99% Buyuan Fangqi Xingzheng Jibie Huan Gaoxin (
99% ) [A Survey on SOE Executives Shows 99% 
Unwilling to Give Up Administrative Rank for Higher Compensation], CHINA BUS. 
JOURNAL (Sept. 1, 2014), http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20140830/003920165299.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/M925-59UM] (reporting a survey result by the Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security of China); Xingjie Chen ( ), Feichu Guoqi Lingdao 
Xingzheng Jibie? Dou Ni Wan’er ( ) [Abandoning 
Administrative Rank in SOEs? Just Kidding], SOHU FINANCE (Oct. 28, 2013), 
http://business.sohu.com/s2013/others786/ [https://perma.cc/T5KK-JEW5] (discussing the 
unachieved goal of abandoning administrative ranks in SOEs). 
 36  Zhang Dayan, Jiexi Yangqi Yibashou: Qian 54 Jia Duowei Fubuji (
) [Analysis of the Heads of Chinese State-Owned Companies: 
Most Heads of the Top 54 Companies Are Vice-Ministerial Level], GLOBAL TIMES (June 3, 
2013), http://china.huanqiu.com/politics/2013-06/3997084.html [https://perma.cc/2LAA-
GFUK]. 
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nature of on-duty consumption, salary at public companies offers 
relatively limited room to maneuver because salary is formally 
budgeted and is disclosed to the public.  Any pay reform short of 
actual delinking of the SOE personnel from the civil service system 
is ineffective in curing the endemic problem of on-duty 
consumption in China’s SOEs. 
B. The Zero-Pay Puzzle 
In China, like the United States, the public discourse on 
executive compensation is focused on excessive pay.  While 
Chinese executives are paid only a fraction of the compensation 
earned by their Western counterparts,37 the public outcry over high 
executive pay is by no means less furious in China.  As discussed in 
Section I, the Chinese government recently has taken measures to 
slash executive compensation in SOEs.  High executive 
compensation is ill-tolerated in China not simply because of the 
weak connection between pay and performance, but more 
importantly, the worsening of social inequality and corruption.  A 
high salary becomes something not for an executive to be proud of, 
but to be questioned.  Highly paid executives now may even stand 
in the spotlight of shame. 
In contrast to eye-catching high compensation, pay as low as 
zero has been largely unnoticed in the literature.  A perusal of the 
compensation data in the corporate annual reports reveals that a 
significant number of top managers particularly directors and 
supervisors report their compensation as zero.  These zero-pay 
executives do not receive any compensation in cash or equity from 
the listed company that they serve.  This section first presents the 
data on the scale of the zero-pay phenomenon and then it explains 
the underlying causes and implications. 
                                                                                                               
 37 In 2014, the average CEO pay at listed firms in China was 2.03 million RMB 
(approximately 326 thousand USD).  Top 10 Mainland CEOs with Best Pay, CHINA DAILY 
(July 28, 2015), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2015-07/28/content_21424926.
htm [https://perma.cc/D2VH-HF76].  The average CEO pay of S&P 500 firms in the 
United States was $13.5 million.  See Executive Pay Watch, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.
org/Corporate-Watch/Paywatch-2015 [https://perma.cc/AKJ4-LA52] (last visited Jan. 13, 
2017). 
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1. The Scale of the Zero-Pay Phenomenon 
This Article collects executive compensation data and 
relevant information from the 2014 annual reports of the companies 
listed on China’s two stock exchanges: the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 38   The dataset 
includes 2,621 listed companies.  Table 1 shows compensation and 
shareholding data by ownership type and management position.  
The zero-pay phenomenon exists mainly for directors and 
supervisors, rather than CEOs.  Still note that 6% of the CEOs of the 
SOEs controlled by the central government do not earn any 
compensation paid by the listed companies they serve.  In contrast 
to CEOs, zero-pay directors and supervisors are strikingly prevalent.  
Table 1 shows that 65.3% (61.2% + 4.1%) of the central SOE 
chairmen, 40.6% (36.2% + 4.4%) of the local SOE chairmen, and 
12.1% (8.8% + 3.3%) of the non-SOE chairmen are unpaid by the 
listed companies they serve. 
 
Table 1. Compensation and Shareholding by Ownership Type 
and Management Position 
 
 Central SOEs Local SOEs Non-SOEs 
CEOs    
Pay + Shareholding 84 (25.3%) 148 (24.1%) 872 (57.1%) 
Pay + No Shareholding 228 (68.7%) 443 (72.1%) 615 (40.3%) 
No Pay + Shareholding 0 (0%) 2 (0.3%) 3 (0.2%) 
No Pay + No Shareholding 20 (6.0%) 21 (3.4%) 35 (2.3%) 
Total 
 
332(100%) 606(100%) 1525(100%) 
Chairmen    
Pay + Shareholding 28 (8.2%) 123 (18.9%) 953(59.9%) 
Pay + No Shareholding 90 (26.5%) 264 (40.5%) 444 (27.9%) 
No Pay + Shareholding 14 (4.1%) 29 (4.4%) 53 (3.3%) 
No Pay + No Shareholding 208 (61.2%) 236 (36.2%) 140 (8.8%) 
Total 340 (100%) 652 (100%) 1590 (100%) 
                                                                                                               
 38 This Article used TEJ, a commercial database that contains comprehensive 
information about ownership and executive compensation of China’s listed companies.  
Moreover, this Article directly extracted information from corporate annual reports to 
confirm data accuracy.  In China, there are many free online financial databases that 
provide comprehensive information of Chinese-listed companies.  The annual reports in 
this Article were downloaded from Sina.com and Stockstar.com.  The data were compiled 
and analyzed with the assistance of computer programs.  The listed companies published 
their 2014 annual reports sometime in 2015.  Data collection for this Article was completed 
in January 2016. 
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Independent Directors    
Pay + Shareholding 4 (0.3%) 7 (0.3%) 14 (0.3%) 
Pay + No Shareholding 1032 (87.5%) 1963 (88.5%) 4430 (90.1%) 
No Pay + Shareholding 0 (0%) 2 (0.01%) 1 (0.02%) 
No Pay + No Shareholding 144 (12.2%) 246 (11.1%) 441 (9.0%) 
Total 
 
1180 (100%) 2218 (100%) 4886 (100%) 
Other Directors (Excluding 
Chairmen and Independent 
Directors) 
   
Pay + Shareholding 169 (9.8%) 373 (11.4%) 2626 (39.3%) 
Pay + No Shareholding 573 (33.3%) 1485 (43.6%) 2522 (37.7%) 
No Pay + Shareholding 55 (3.2%) 87 (2.7%) 274 (4.1%) 
No Pay + No Shareholding 922 (53.6%) 1325 (40.6%) 1268 (19.0%) 
Total 
 
1719 (100%) 3260(100%) 6690 (100%) 
Supervisors    
Pay + Shareholding 100 (6.8%) 230 (8.2%) 940 (18.1%) 
Pay + No Shareholding 721 (48.9%) 1513 (54.2%) 3299 (63.6%) 
No Pay + Shareholding 24(1.6%) 62(2.2%) 93(1.8%) 
No Pay + No Shareholding 629 (42.7%) 988(35.7%) 854(16.5%) 
Total 1474 (100%) 
 
2793 (100%) 5186 (100%) 
 
The zero-pay phenomenon is much less visible among 
independent directors.   Among the independent directors of the 
central SOEs, only 12.2% of them receive no compensation.  A 
slightly lower percentage is shown among the local SOE chairmen 
(11.2%) and among the non-SOE chairmen (9.2%).  The 
compensation of independent directors has been fairly standardized, 
in which independent directors typically receive a fixed amount of 
cash payment, with an average (excluding zero-pay independent 
directors) of about 72,000 RMB a year. 39   The zero-pay 
phenomenon is not a result of independent directors as unpaid 
volunteers. 
For other directors (i.e. directors excluding chairmen and 
independent directors), the zero-pay phenomenon is evident in the 
data.  More than 56% of such directors in the central SOEs, 43% in 
the local SOEs, and 23% in the non-SOEs receive no compensation.  
Similar to directors, 44.3% of the central SOE supervisors, 37.9% of 
                                                                                                               
 39 The average amount is calculated based on the 7,488 paid independent directors in 
the author’s dataset. 
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the local SOE supervisors and 18.3% of the non-SOE supervisors 
earn no compensation. 
Overall, Table 1 shows that a significant percentage of 
directors and supervisors of the listed SOEs, particularly those 
controlled by the central government, report zero in compensation.  
Moreover, most of the zero-pay managers (including directors, 
supervisors and CEOs) do not have any shareholdings, which 
suggests that the zero-pay phenomenon is not a result of 
shareholdings as a substitute for compensation. 
Table 2 further shows the distribution of zero-pay boards of 
directors by ownership type.  A significant portion of listed 
companies, particularly those controlled by the central government, 
demonstrate a board composed of a majority of zero-pay directors.  
For example, among the 343 central SOEs, sixty companies (17%) 
have a board in which between 51% and 60% of the directors on the 
board do not earn any compensation or hold any shares in the listed 
company.  Table 2 shows that approximately 27% of the listed 
companies controlled by the central government have a board 
dominated a majority of zero-pay directors.40  This is 15% for local 
SOEs and only 3% for non-SOEs. 
 
Table 2. Structure of the Board of Directors, by Ownership 
Type 
 
 Central SOE Boards Local SOE Boards Non-SOE Boards 
Percentage of No-
Pay Directors on 
the Board 
   
0-10% 31 (9%) 133 (20%) 781(49%) 
11-20% 32 (9%) 104 (16%) 370 (23%) 
21-30% 48 (14%) 112 (17%) 186 (12%) 
31-40% 66 (19%) 100 (15%) 116 (7%) 
41-50% 68 (20%) 111 (17%) 77 (5%) 
51-60% 60 (17%) 63 (9%) 40 (2%) 
61-70% 22 (6%) 25 (4%) 13 (1%) 
71-80% 10 (3%) 12 (2%) 4 (0%) 
81-90% 5 (1%) 3 (0%) 8 (0%) 
91-100% 1 (0%) 1 (0%) 6 (0%) 
Total 343 (100%) 664 (100%) 1601 (100%) 
 
                                                                                                               
 40 In Table 2, 27% = 17% + 6% + 3% + 1%. 
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Similarly, Table 3 shows the distribution of the pay 
structures of the supervisory boards.  Again, it clearly shows that the 
zero-pay boards are mainly concentrated in the state-controlled 
firms—47% of the central SOEs and 30% of the local SOEs have a 
supervisory board whose majority is zero-pay supervisors. 
 
Table 3. Structure of the Board of Supervisors, by Ownership 
Type 
 
 Central SOE Boards Local SOE Boards Non-SOE Boards 
Percentage of No-
Pay Supervisors 
on the Board 
   
0–10% 57 (17%) 167 (25%) 1049 (66%) 
11–20% 23 (7%) 50 (8%) 37 (2%) 
21–30% 5 (1%) 14 (2%) 8 (0%) 
31–40% 80 (23%) 195 (29%) 286 (18%) 
41–50% 16 (5%) 32 (5%) 10 (1%) 
51–60% 62 (18%) 76 (11%) 23 (1%) 
61–70% 88 (26%) 113 (17%) 172 (11%) 
71–80% 5 (1%) 7 (1%) 4 (0%) 
81–90% 0 (0%) 2 (0%) 0 (0%) 
91–100% 7 (2%) 8 (1%) 12 (1%) 
Total 343 (100%) 664 (100%) 1601 (100%) 
2. Causes and Implications 
The large number of zero-pay directors and supervisors, as 
shown above, warrants an exploration of underlying reasons and 
implications.  Why are there so many no-pay directors and 
supervisors?  Is their compensation really zero as reported in the 
annual report? 
The zero-pay phenomenon cannot be adequately explained 
without looking into the network in which the listed firm is 
embedded.  While ostensibly a large number of directors and 
supervisors are unpaid by the listed companies they serve, they are 
actually paid by the controlling shareholders or other corporate 
affiliates.  As noted in this author’s previous work, the typical 
approach to the study of Chinese corporate governance takes the 
listed firm as a stand-alone unit of analysis. 41   This approach 
certainly generates insights, but it ignores the important fact that 
                                                                                                               
 41 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 18. 
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business groups are pervasive in China and the listed firm is just a 
subsidiary embedded in a web of corporate entities, as earlier 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
One feature of Chinese business groups is that there are 
frequent personnel interlocks among member firms in a group.  Top 
managers of a member firm such as a listed firm often occupy top 
management positions of other member firms (often non-listed 
firms) in the same group.  Such personnel interlocks complicate 
executive compensation within the group.  China’s securities 
regulations require the listed company to explicitly state in its 
annual report whether or not each of the top managers receives any 
compensation paid by its shareholders or other affiliates.42  Table 4 
summarizes the number and percentage of top managers who are 
not paid by the listed company but instead paid by the listed firm’s 
shareholders or subsidiaries, according to the data disclosed in the 
2014 annual reports. 
 
Table 4. Whether Zero-Pay Managers Paid by Shareholders or 
Subsidiaries 
 
 Central 
SOEs 
Local SOEs Non-SOEs Total 
Zero-Pay CEOs     
Paid by Shareholders or 
Subsidiaries 
7 (35%) 6 (26%) 4 (11%) 17(21%) 
Not Paid by Shareholders 
or Subsidiaries 
13 (65%) 17 (74%) 34 (89%) 64(79%) 
Total 20 (100%) 23 (100%) 38 (100%) 81(100%) 
Zero-Pay Chairmen     
Paid by Shareholders or 
Subsidiaries 
112 (50%) 157 (59%) 97 (50%) 366 (54%) 
Not Paid by Shareholders 
or Subsidiaries 
110 (50%) 108 (41%) 96 (50%) 314 (46%) 
Total 222 
(100%) 
265 (100%) 193 (100%) 680 (100%) 
Zero-Pay Directors 
(excluding Chairmen) 
    
Paid by Shareholders or 
Subsidiaries 
473 (42%) 779 (47%) 587 (30%) 1839 (39%) 
Not Paid by Shareholders 
or Subsidiaries 
648 (58%) 871 (53%) 1397 (70%) 2916 (61%) 
Total 
 
1121 
(100%) 
1650 (100%) 1984 
(100%) 
4755 (100%) 
                                                                                                               
 42 See supra Part I, Section B (Securities Regulations for Listed Companies). 
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Zero-Pay Supervisors     
Paid by Shareholders or 
Subsidiaries 
309 (47%) 594 (57%) 429 (45%) 1332 (50%) 
Not Paid by Shareholders 
or Subsidiaries 
344 (53%) 456 (43%) 518 (55%) 1318 (50%) 
Total 
 
653 
(100%) 
1050 (100%) 947 (100%) 2650 (100%) 
 
Table 4 suggests that many of the zero-pay top managers are 
paid by the listed companies’ affiliates.  It shows that 21% of the 
zero-pay CEOs, 54% of the zero-pay chairmen, 39% of the zero-pay 
directors (excluding chairs), and 50% of the zero-pay supervisors 
are paid by the listed company’s affiliates, instead of the listed 
company itself.  Still, these numbers based on the annual reports are 
significantly underestimated.  The concept of “affiliates” is broadly 
defined in China’s company law, yet in practice, Chinese companies 
improperly narrow the scope of the definition and thus underreport 
compensation by affiliates. 43   The paying affiliates usually are 
controlling shareholders (i.e. parent companies).  A typical example 
is as follows: The chairman (Zhou Jiping) of PetroChina, an SOE 
listed on the Shanghai and the New York Stock Exchanges, earned 
no compensation paid by the listed company itself but rather by the 
parent company that is wholly owned by SASAC.  Zhou 
                                                                                                               
 43 According to Section 217 of China’s Company Law, affiliate relationships include 
the company’s relationships with the controlling shareholder, the actual controller, 
directors, supervisors or senior officers; or any direct or indirect control relationship with 
the company; any other relations that may transfer the company’s interests; state-controlled 
companies are not affiliates simply because of they are owned by the state.  Company Law 
art. 217, supra note 9.  The controlling shareholder is any shareholder who owns more than 
50% of the company’s shares or any shareholder who owns less than 50% but holds 
enough votes to influence the decisions of the shareholder meeting.  The actual controller 
is anyone who is not a shareholder but holds enough influence through equity or 
contractual relations with the company to influence the company’s behavior.  Despite this 
broad legal definition, companies in practice limit affiliates to the direct controlling 
shareholder (i.e. the parent company) when reporting whether executives are paid by 
affiliates.  Thus, if an executive is a senior manager of and paid by the parent’s controlling 
shareholder or affiliates controlled by the same parent company, it would go unreported. 
A prominent example is the chairman of China United Network Communications 
Ltd., Chang Xiabing, has been reported since 2004 in the annual reports that he earned no 
compensation paid by the listed firm or its affiliates.  However, Chang was reported in the 
annual reports of China Unicom that he was paid by China Unicom, an affiliate listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange.  China United Network and China Unicom belong to the 
same business group, are owned by the same parent company, and China United Network 
is an indirect controlling shareholder of China Unicom.  Moreover, there are overlaps in 
their top management personnel.  This is just one example.  In my data collection process, I 
noticed that it is fairly common that companies fail to report compensation by affiliates. 
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simultaneously as the chairman of the parent company was subject 
to SASAC’s pay decision.  His compensation was decided behind 
closed doors by SASAC, rather than by the governance institutions 
(i.e. the board of directors and shareholder meetings) of the listed 
company.44  This pay arrangement is unobservable from the annual 
report, unless one understands the corporate network and how 
SASAC wields its control over executive compensation.  But even if 
the listed company honestly discloses whether or not each of its top 
managers earns compensation paid by its affiliates, the 
compensation remains a myth to the public, as the regulations do 
not require any disclosure of the amount paid by the corporate 
affiliates.  
The corporate group structure and the disclosure rules 
together nicely serve the interests of the state-owner.  Chinese SOE 
executive compensation, often riddled with corruption, is a 
politically sensitive issue that the state-owner has been trying to 
keep in secrecy.  However, it is becoming difficult to maintain 
secrecy for listed companies because of the increasing demand for 
transparency in the corporate governance world.  It is fair to say that 
the zero-pay phenomenon is a temporary balance between the state-
owner’s (or the ruling elite’s) secrecy interests and the demand of 
convergence on internationally-accepted disclosure rules.  While 
Chinese regulators adopt the rule requiring disclosure of each top 
manager’s compensation paid by the listed company, they allow the 
listed company to hide compensation in its corporate affiliates 
without violating the disclosure rule. 
This information-hiding strategy permitted by China’s 
domestic securities rules is not effectively mitigated by cross-listing 
to international capital markets.  Table 5 shows the number and 
percentage of zero-pay managers of the eighty-eight Chinese 
companies with shares listed both on domestic and international 
stock exchanges.  It shows that 8% of the CEOs, 41% of the 
chairmen, 31% of the directors (excluding chairmen), and 34% of 
the supervisors of the Chinese cross-listed companies report zero in 
compensation paid by the listed firm they serve.  As previously 
discussed, these zero-pay managers are actually paid by the listed 
company’s affiliates an amount not publicly disclosed.  Most of 
these zero-pay companies are state-owned, including high-profile 
                                                                                                               
 44 Lin & Milhaupt, surpa note 18, at 742–743. 
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firms such as PetroChina, Sinopec, Chalco, and many others 
simultaneously listed on the Shanghai and the New York Stock 
Exchanges.  The Chinese state-owner’s interest in mystifying 
executive compensation remains unharmed despite 
internationalization of the listed firms.  The limited role of 
international cross-listing in bringing transparency to executive 
compensation of Chinese cross-listed firms partly relates to the 
regulatory fact that foreign issuers often enjoy lots of disclosure 
exemptions and often compliance with the listed company’s 
domestic rules would be deemed sufficient.  The zero-pay 
phenomenon persistent in cross-listed Chinese companies offers 
another piece of evidence to question whether cross-listing delivers 
any real positive effects on Chinese firms.45 
 
Table 5. The Zero-Pay Situation Among Firms with Shares 
Listed Overseas 
 
 Total Number of 
Managers  
(a) 
Number of Zero-
Pay Managers  
(b) 
Percentage of 
Zero-Pay 
Managers 
(b)/(a) 
CEOs 87 7 8% 
Chairmen 85 35 41% 
Directors (Excluding 
Chairmen) 
863 270 31% 
Supervisors 409 138 34% 
 
A practical implication of the zero-pay phenomenon is that 
any measures of top management compensation of Chinese-listed 
companies should be taken with great caution.  For example, as 
shown in Table 6 below, the average compensation varies 
significantly with the inclusion or exclusion of the zero-pay 
managers.  Unfortunately, existing literature on Chinese executive 
compensation does not make it clear whether the sample includes or 
excludes zero-pay managers.46 
 
                                                                                                               
 45 See Donald Clarke, The Bonding Effect in Cross-Listed Chinese Companies: Is It 
Real? (George Washington Univ. Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 2015-55, 2015) 
(discussing the effect of cross-listing on Chinese companies.). 
 46 None of the studies reviewed in Appendix articulates whether it includes or 
excludes zero-pay executives in its data analysis. 
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Table 6. Average Pay Differences If Zero-Pay Managers 
Included or Excluded 
 
 Including 
Zero-Pay 
[a] 
Excluding 
Zero-Pay 
[b] 
Difference 
(RMB) 
[b-a] 
Difference 
(%) 
[(b-a)/a] 
Chairmen 545,249 
(2,596) 
739, 635 
(1,914) 
194,386 35.7% 
Directors 
(Excluding 
Chair) 
217,179 
(20,061) 
285,286 
(15,272) 
68,107 31.4% 
Supervisors 185,681 
(9,499) 
258,100 
(6,834) 
72,419 39% 
Note: Number of managers in brackets. 
 
Fundamentally, the zero-pay phenomenon raises doubt over 
top managers’ ability to act in the best interest of the listed company.  
The standard approach to the study of executive compensation 
views pay as a solution to the agency problem.  Compensation 
schemes are to provide directors and officers with efficient 
incentives to loyally pursue the interests of the company that they 
serve.  But the loyalty to the listed company may be in jeopardy 
when directors and officers are not compensated by the listed 
company itself but by its controlling shareholder; what is worse is 
that the amount of compensation is a black box to the public.  This 
hidden pay arrangement may exacerbate the central governance 
problem in concentrated ownership structure—controlling 
shareholders exploit minority shareholders.  As this author recently 
noted in a co-authored work on China’s state capitalism, the state-
owner “seeks to maximize a range of benefits extending from state 
revenues to technology prowess and from soft power aboard to 
regime survival at home.” 47   In the eye of the state-owner, the 
individual listed firm’s financial interests are subordinate to the 
country’s interests as defined by the ruling elite.  Pay by the 
controlling shareholder rather than the listed firm itself reinforces 
this interest preference. 
Finally, the zero-pay phenomenon calls for rethinking the 
meaning of executive compensation in the Chinese context.  The 
compensation disclosed in the annual report is the amount legally 
                                                                                                               
 47 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 18, at 746. 
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approved by the board of directors and/or the shareholder meeting.  
It is a legitimate financial incentive given to executives.  However, 
are Chinese SOE managers really motivated by the legitimate pay or 
more by something else?48  China’s SOE system is full of rent-
seeking opportunities for top managers.  Financial gains are not 
necessarily in the form of legal compensation but illegal payments 
such as bribes. 49   Political career advancements may be another 
form of incentive. 50   If they are motivated by executive 
compensation, companies should fill in the blank spaces of 
compensation tables in the annual report.  But if they are actually 
not motivated by executive compensation, then the disclosed pay in 
the annual report, regardless of the amount, does not matter much 
and leaves a black hole of what to be disclosed to investors. 
                                                                                                               
 48 This question is vividly illustrated by the recent comment by the former chairman 
of China Mobile, Wang Jianzhou, a SOE listed on the Hong Kong and New York Stock 
Exchanges.  In the Summer Annual Meeting (known as Summer Davos) of the World 
Economic Forum, held in September 2015, Wang as chairman of the Association of 
China’s Listed Companies commented on executive pay cuts and stated, “To be honest, top 
managers of large SOEs and large enterprises consider a lot of things everyday as they 
manage tens of thousands of employees and they do not really care about the level of 
personal executive pay.”  Wang Jianzhong: Daxing Guoqi Fuzeren Dui “Xianxin” Zhende 
Butai Zaiyi, ( ” ” ) [Wang Jianzhong: 
Large SOE Executives Not Worried about Limiting Compensation], CAIJING MAGAZINE 
(Sept. 9, 2015), http://economy.caijing.com.cn/20150909/3964095.shtml [https://perma.cc/
4NDW-F8KS]. 
 49 It was reported that SOE executives accounted for 76% of the 605 cases of 
entrepreneurs as criminals for the year of 2015 alone.  The top three crimes for SOE 
executives were bribery (278 cases), corruption (66) and embezzlement (21).  The cases 
have been increasing over the past years.  2015 Niandu Zhongguo Qiyejia Fanzui Baogao 
(Meiti Yangben) Pilu Qiyejia Fanzui Tedian (2015
) [2015 Criminal Report of China’s Entrepreneurs reveals the 
criminal patterns and tendencies of Chinese entrepreneurs], LEGAL DAILY (Apr. 5, 2016), 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index_article/content/2016-04/05/content_6551886.htm?
node=5955 [https://perma.cc/M8GJ-D5AH].  The report is an annual publication starting in 
2009 by Legal Daily, Legal Weekly, and China Youth Daily to track criminal records of 
Chinese entrepreneurs. 
 50 Jerry Cao et al., Political Promotion, CEO Compensation and Their Effect on Firm 
Performance, SSRN (Nov. 16, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1512142 [https://perma.cc/VW7S-DHPN] (showing that “both monetary and political 
incentives are positively related to firm performance” and moreover “the monetary 
compensation-based incentive is weaker when CEO incentives are heavily driven by 
political career concerns”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
2016] BEHIND THE NUMBERS 169 
 
C. Nominal Versus Actual Pay 
For a company to report that it has paid no compensation to 
its executives is intuitively suspicious and should be subject to close 
scrutiny.  Still, ostensibly reasonable compensation figures 
disclosed in the corporate annual report can be misleading, 
particularly for Chinese SOEs.  The amount of pay disclosed in the 
annual report may be a nominal rather than actual amount paid to 
SOE managers, and the gap between nominal pay and actual pay 
can be very large. 
The nominal versus actual pay practice traces back to the 
overseas listing wave among Chinese SOEs in the 1990s.  It was 
created as an expedient solution to the disparity between the pay 
level allowed in China’s state-owned sector and the pay level 
demanded in the international capital market.  On the one hand, 
executive compensation of Chinese SOEs traditionally was 
shockingly low by international standards.  The low pay could raise 
a red flag on Chinese firms’ governance quality and could 
negatively affect their initial public offering (IPO) price and 
subsequent corporate value in the international capital market.  On 
the other hand, international pay practices, especially stock options 
that often drive compensation high, were incompatible with the 
traditional pay system of Chinese SOEs, whose top managers were 
often government officials and their pay was benchmarked against 
civil service pay.  In the face of the institutional clashes, Chinese 
SOEs contrived the appearance of adopting Western-style 
compensation schemes to alleviate the market concerns while at the 
same time clandestinely making informal arrangements with their 
top managers to maintain the state’s control over compensation.  A 
recent study suggests that stock options granted to executives of 
Chinese SOEs listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, many of 
which are also on the New York Stock Exchange, are “merely 
window dressing” to satisfy the taste of foreign investors. 51  
Executives of Chinese-listed SOEs are never allowed to freely 
exercise stock options shown in corporate annual reports, and even 
                                                                                                               
 51 Zhihong Chen et al., Are Stock Option Grants to Directors of State-Controlled 
Chinese Firms Listed in Hong Kong Genuine Compensation? 88 ACCOUNTING REV. 1547, 
1549 (2013). 
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if exercised, they are expected or required to surrender the gain to 
the parent company.52 
The nominal versus actual pay practice is further 
institutionalized by SASAC’s compensation management beyond its 
legal authority.  SASAC is legally authorized to manage executive 
compensation of the companies under its direct ownership (i.e., the 
parent company rather than the listed subsidiary in Figure 2).  In 
reality, SASAC’s compensation management power effectively 
reaches down to the listed subsidiary.  Top managers of the listed 
subsidiary who are also executives of the parent company are in fact 
subject to SASAC’s pay decisions, which effectively override the 
pay approved by the board of the listed company. 53   Available 
information indicates that the actual compensation approved by 
SASAC and paid to the executives can be very different from 
(usually considerably less than) the nominal pay disclosed in the 
annual report.54  This important fact (that many SOEs do not receive 
                                                                                                               
 52 Id. at 1556. 
 53 Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 18, at 742–743. 
 54 The actual and nominal pay disparity sometimes may be observed in an 
inconspicuous footnote of an annual report.  For example, Poly Real Estate (a listed central 
SOE) disclosed in a footnote of its 2012 annual report that “according to the compensation 
system approved by the board of directors, the chairman (SONG, Guangju)’s total 
compensation for the fiscal year of 2012 should be 2.8 million; however, according to 
SASAC’s decision, the pre-tax actual pay is 605 thousand dollars.”  The company’s 2013, 
2014, and 2015 annual reports stated in a footnote that “the chairman’s compensation was 
unavailable for disclosure because SASAC had not yet completed the annual performance 
review for the chairman.” 
For central SOEs, CNOOC Ltd, which is one of the largest state-owned oil 
companies in China and is listed on the Hong Kong and New York Stock Exchanges, is the 
most representative case.  CNOOC’s annual reports disclosed that several of its top 
managers were paid multi million dollars (RMB) annually, which aroused public anger in 
2009.  In response, CNOOC clarified that since the first day of the listings in 2001, all the 
top managers had agreed to donate the pay approved by the board of directors to the parent 
company and they actually received the amount determined by SASAC rather than the 
amount published to the public.  According to CNOOC, the difference between the actual 
pay and the nominal pay was like “the sky and the earth.”  Zhonghaiyou Huiying Qianwan 
Nianxin: Shiji yu “Mingyi” Shouru You Tianrangzhibie ( : ”
” )[CNOOC Reply to Ten Million Annual Pay: Actual and Nominal Pay 
Like Sky and the Earth], XINHUA NEWS (Apr. 14, 2009) 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2009-04/13/content_11180853.htm 
[https://perma.cc/X5UE-FQMW] (reporting the public explanation made by CNOOC’s 
spokesman).  CNOOC’s statements were consistent with information given by SASAC’s 
officials in interviews.  Guoziwei Zhuanjia: Qiye Laozong Nianxin Duowei 40 Wan Wu 
Baiwan Nianxin ( 40  ) [SASAC Experts: 
Annual Executive Pay at Central SOEs often 400 Thousand Dollars, No One Over One 
Million], CHINA ECON. WEEKLY (Sep. 21, 2009), http://business.sohu.com/20090921/
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the pay disclosed in the annual report but rather a pay internally 
determined by SASAC) is sometimes downplayed as a footnote in 
the annual report or buried in obscure corporate documents.  More 
often, it is entirely unstated. 
How SASAC determines SOE executive compensation is 
opaque, though it has published some rules regarding its 
compensation policy.  According to the published rules, the basic 
structure of managerial compensation includes three parts: base 
salaries, performance bonuses, and mid-/long-term incentive 
compensation.  Briefly speaking, the base salary is a function of the 
size of the enterprise, the difficulty level of managing the enterprise, 
the responsibilities undertaken, and the average worker’s pay of the 
given enterprise, the given industry, and the given city where the 
enterprise is located.55   Managers receive base salaries monthly.  
The structure and payment of performance bonuses are based on a 
much more complicated formula in which political loyalty to the 
Chinese Communist Party is a factor.56  The performance bonus is 
                                                                                                               
n266867391.shtml [https://perma.cc/BHA8-4EB2] (reporting that SASAC cites SOE 
executive pay generally at 400 thousand yuan and not over one million yuan). 
For local SOEs, Huayuan Property is a case which was widely reported.  Since 
2008, the company had disclosed in its annual reports that its chairmen (Ren Zhiqiang) 
earned more than 7 million RMB.  In the face of the public outcry over the excessive 
compensation, the company released a formal statement in 2010 explaining Ren’s 
compensation composition and it flagged the fact that Ren’s compensation was determined 
by SASAC and for the fiscal year of 2009, the amount approved by SASAC was less than 
700,000 RMB, only one tenth of the disclosed amount in the annual report.  Huayuan 
Dichan Gufen Youxian Gongsi Chengqing Gonggao ( ) 
[Huanyan Property Public Announcement], SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH. (Feb. 4, 2010), 
http://www.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/ [https://perma.cc/99XS-XV9K] 
(clarifying Ren Zhiqiang’s compensation.) 
 55 SASAC published a formula for use in calculating managerial compensation.  For 
the CEO or chairman of the enterprise, formula is: W = W0*L*R.  W indicates the base 
salary.  W0 indicates five times of the average worker’s pay in state-owned enterprises 
nationwide in the past year.  L indicates a combination index including the assets size, 
industry, profits, etc.  R indicates a value between 1 and 1.4 determined by SASAC.  
Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Xinchou Guanli Zanxing Banfa Shixing Xize (
) [Implementation Detailed Rules for Provisional Measures 
on Compensation Administration of Top Managers of the Central State-Owned Enterprises] 
(promulgated by SASAC, June 11, 2004). 
 56 See Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Jingying Yeji Kaohe Zanxing Banfa (
) [Measures on Performance Evaluation of Top Managers of the 
Central State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated by SASAC, Dec. 29, 2012) (stating the 
provisional measures on performance evaluation of top managers of central state-owned 
enterprises); Zhongyang Qiye Lingdao Banzi he Lingdao Renyuan Zonghe Kaohe Pingjia 
Banfa ( ) [Measures on the 
Comprehensive Performance Evaluation of Top Management Teams and Top Managers of 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss2/2
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contingent on the annual performance evaluation and the three-year 
term review. 57   However, how the SOE executives are actually 
evaluated and paid under these formal rules remains unclear. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
A. Implications for Comparative Corporate Governance 
Scholarship 
The central theme of comparative corporate governance 
scholarship seeks to explain the variance of governance systems 
around the world.  Among various factors, politics has been 
recognized as a key explanation for different national governance 
regimes. 58   Nevertheless, the mainstream approach to executive 
compensation pays limited attention to politics.  Most recent studies 
of executive compensation have relied on optimal contracting 
theory or managerial power theory, both of which are developed 
with a focus on the U.S. experience.59  Optimal contracting theory 
assumes that boards are able to bargain with managers and get 
optimal contracts for shareholders’ interests.  Managerial power 
theory, however, argues that the level and structure of executive 
compensation are not shaped by efficient contracting but rather 
distorted by rent-seeking managers who are able to capture board 
members to set their own compensation.  However, as leading 
executive pay scholar Kevin Murphy critically commented on the 
U.S. executive pay literature, 
Most recent analyses of executive compensation 
have focused on efficient-contracting or managerial-
power rationales for pay, while ignoring or 
                                                                                                               
the Central State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated by SASAC, Dec. 30, 2009) (stating the 
performance evaluation criteria of top management teams of central state-owned 
enterprises). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Mark Roe has been a leading advocate for the importance of politics in shaping 
corporate governance systems.  MARK ROE, THE POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT 63 (2003) (discussing the 
importance of politics in corporate governance). 
 59 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2006) (criticizing optimal 
contracting theory and offering an alternative view, managerial power theory). 
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downplaying the causes and consequences of 
disclosure requirements, tax policies, accounting 
rules, legislation, and the general political climate.  A 
central theme of this study is that government 
intervention has been both a response to and a major 
driver of time trends in executive compensation over 
the past century, and that any explanation for pay 
that ignores political factors is critically 
incomplete.60  
This observation is truer in the Chinese context.  Scholars of 
Chinese executive compensation, like their U.S. counterparts, 
follow the two prevailing theories.  However, they are certainly 
aware of the important role of government intervention given that 
the most important enterprises in China are state-owned.  More 
often than not, the scholars treat government intervention as 
equivalent to binary independent variables of state ownership (i.e., 
whether or not the firm is owned by the state) or top managers’ 
political connections (i.e., whether or not the firm’s top managers 
are former or incumbent government officers).  This Article adds a 
new dimension of government influence through the lens of 
disclosure rules.  China’s disclosure regulations give controlling 
shareholders great latitude in maneuvering executive compensation 
reporting and ultimately mask the true numbers of executive pay of 
publicly listed companies.  The ruling elite’s interest in limiting 
public scrutiny over its SOE personnel management remains largely 
unharmed despite ostensibly mandatory disclosure of each 
individual executive’s compensation under the securities regulations.  
The disclosure regime well serves the interests of the state-owner 
(or the ruling elite). 
Another issue that relates to comparative corporate 
governance scholarship is the perennial debate about the future 
trajectory of national corporate governance systems in the era of 
globalization.  Will they converge on a universal model or will they 
continue to retain their national characteristics?  For executive 
compensation, its convergence question essentially asks whether 
                                                                                                               
 60 KEVIN MURPHY, Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There, 
in 2 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE, 211, 211–356 (George M. Constantinides 
et al. eds., 2013). 
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there is “Americanization” of executive pay—the prevalent use of 
performance-oriented pay and lucrative compensation.61  On its face, 
China seems to present “formal convergence”62 in the sense that 
China’s recent regulations explicitly advocate for performance-
oriented pay (such as cash bonuses and stock options), a key feature 
of the U.S. pay paradigm.  Moreover, empirical evidence based on 
the formal numbers disclosed in the annual reports of China’s listed 
companies show that while executives earn only a fraction of 
compensation paid to American executives, their compensation has 
been rising swiftly.63  While the recent formal rules and formal pay 
figures show some changes toward U.S. standards, informal 
practices (including on-duty consumption, zero-pay practice, and 
nominal-actual pay divides) place a cautionary note on the 
substantive meaning of the converging formal rules and formal pay 
figures. 
Related to the convergence debate, the informal pay 
practices offer an illustration of pay reform and “institutional 
complementarity,” 64  a concept used by scholars of comparative 
corporate governance to describe that institutions are resistant to 
change due to institutional interdependence.  As previously 
discussed in Section III, the informal pay practices are important 
institutions complementary to the government’s peculiar personnel 
management in which there are frequent rotations between the 
government bureaus and SOEs.  The personnel linkages across the 
government and the SOE sector facilitate the formation and 
implementation of national economic policy and promote coalition 
                                                                                                               
 61 Brian Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, The Globalization (Americanization?) of 
Executive Pay, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 233 (2004). 
 62 Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or 
Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (defining “formal convergence” as convergence of rules 
on the books). 
 63 See Alex Bryson, John Forth & Minghai Zhou., Same or Different? The CEO 
Labour Market in China’s Public Listed Companies, 124 ECON. J. 90 (2014) (finding that 
the average total cash and bonus compensation for a top executive in 2010 was equivalent 
to U.S. $129,399, and that pay has doubled between 2005 and 2010). 
 64 The leading work using “institutional complementarities” to compare political 
economies is Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in 
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 1st ed. 2001) (stating that any political 
economy is composed of several institutions such as corporate governance, labor markets, 
etc., and that such institutions become functionally complement over time with the result 
that the institutions are stable and difficult to change). 
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among the ruling elite.  Because SOE executive pay is inextricably 
tied to personnel appointments, any significant change to the pay 
institution requires a functional adjustment of its interconnected 
appointment institution.  The government’s recent SOE reform 
policy, as discussed below in detail, suggests that the 
complementarity of executive pay and personnel appointment 
institutions makes pay reform more challenging. 
B. Implications for Reform Policy 
In recent years, executive compensation has become high on 
the Chinese SOE reform agenda.  The Chinese government has 
promulgated many rules to curb excessive executive pay at SOEs.  
In the wake of the global financial crisis, China’s Ministry of 
Finance imposed a policy where the maximum pre-tax pay at state-
controlled financial institutions would be 2.8 million RMB.65  More 
recently, amid the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, the 
government declared that the base salary for central SOE executives 
is equal to twice the average worker’s pay.  Annual performance 
bonuses should be no more than twice the base salary, and on-duty 
consumption should be constrained.66  Local-government SOEs are 
                                                                                                               
 65 Jinrong lei Guoyou he Guoyou Konggu Qiye Fuzeren Xinchou Guanli Banfa (
) [Administrative Measures on Top 
Managerial Compensation of State-Owned and State-Controlled Financial Enterprises] 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, Jan. 13, 2009).  For a summary, see Guanyu 
Jinrong lei Guoyou he Guoyou Konggu Qiye Fuzeren Xinchou Guanli Youguan Wenti de 
Tongzhi ( ) 
[Regarding the Notice on Issues Pertaining to Top Managerial Compensation of State-
Owned and State-Controlled Financial Enterprises], MINISTRY OF FINANCE (Jan. 13, 2009), 
http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengwengao/2009niancaizhengbuwengao/caizh
engwengao2009dierqi/200904/t20090413_132166.html [https://perma.cc/C2QV-CYF9].  
For information about the rules, see Jinronglei Guoyouhe Guoyou Konggu Qiye Fuzeren 
Xinchou Guanli Tongzhi ( ) [Notice of 
the Administrative Measures on Top Managerial Compensation of State-Owned and State-
Controlled Financial Enterprises], PEOPLE.CN (Feb. 9, 2009), http://finance.people.com.cn/
GB/1040/8771812.html [https://perma.cc/MY5A-B5BU] (stating the administrative 
measures on managerial compensation for state-owned and state-controlled financial 
enterprises).  Regarding pay caps, see Jinrong lei Guoqi Fuzeren Nianxin Ni 280 Wan 
Fengding Zuidi 2.5 Wan ( 280  2.5 ) [Pay for 
Top Executives at State-Owned Financial Enterprises Capped at 2.8 Million RMB, Lowest 
25,000 RMB], XINHUA (Feb. 9, 2009), http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2009-02/09/
content_10785439.htm [https://perma.cc/36YL-AG3N]. 
 66 Zhongyang Guanli Qiye Fuzeren Xinchou Zhidu Gaige Fangan (
) [Reform Scheme on Executive Compensation of the Central 
State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated by the Central Politburo of the Communist Party 
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subject to similar policies as well.67  Overall, the pay reforms to date 
have been focused on the substantive components of compensation 
rather than the decision-making process and transparency.68  Indeed, 
transparency is particularly challenging in China’s political 
environment.  Disclosure of SOE executive pay may intensify the 
public’s outrage against economic inequality and political 
corruption.  It touches a nerve with China’s ruling elite who are 
dreadful of any threat to social and political stability.  Furthermore, 
as shown in this Article, even though mandatory disclosure rules of 
executive compensation are in place, it does not necessarily lead to 
transparency when misrepresentation is actually orchestrated by the 
government out of its own political interests, and gatekeepers 
including lawyers and auditors give way to this political reality.  
The transparency reform of executive compensation in China 
requires not just releasing numbers to the public but information 
credibility verification and truthful disclosure culture.69  Otherwise, 
the disclosed numbers would be just whatever the company (or the 
state-owner) wants them to appear to the public.  
In late December 2016, SASAC for the first time disclosed 
executive compensation of the 111 SOEs under its control.70  As 
noted, many zero-pay managers of the listed companies are actually 
paid by the parent companies under SASAC’s control.  This 
disclosure initiative fills some information gaps in the zero-pay 
puzzle.  According to the released data, the highest pre-tax pay in 
                                                                                                               
of China, Aug. 29, 2014, effective Jan. 1, 2015); Guanyu Heli Queding bing Yange Guifan 
Zhongyang Qiye Fuzeren Lvzhi Daiyu, Yewu Zhichu de Yijian (
) [Opinions on Rationalizing and Strictly 
Regulating Position-Related Treatments and Business-Related Expenses of Top Managers 
of the Central State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated by the Central Politburo of the 
Communist Party of China, Aug. 29, 2014). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Tellingly, even the reform rules themselves have no transparency.  The government 
has never published the text of the rules but only publicly disclosed a brief summary of the 
reform policies.  While rumors in the news suggest that the government will soon disclose 
SOE executive compensation in detail, no progress in this regard has been detected. 
 69 SASAC officials have sometimes informally disclosed fragmented information 
about SOE executive compensation in news interviews.  However, this informal way of 
disclosure has no comparability and reliability. 
 70 SASAC, Guowuyuan Guoziwei Guanli Qiye Fuzeren 2015 Niandu Xinchou Xinxi 
Pilu ( ) [Announcement of the 
Compensation of Corporate Persons in Charge under SASAC Management in 2015] (Dec. 
29, 2016), http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n85463/n327265/n327406/n327425/c2513588/content.
html [https://perma.cc/X38V-3745].  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
2016] BEHIND THE NUMBERS 177 
 
2015 was $1.2 million RMB and the executive pay was often 
between $500,000 and $800,000 RMB. 71   Although this recent 
disclosure initiative is an encouraging move towards transparency, 
such disclosure suffers a significant time lag and faces credibility 
challenges.72    
It is fair to say that all the “behind the numbers” problems 
are essentially rooted in China’s peculiar personnel management 
system. The Chinese Communist Party as the visible hand governs 
the SOE executive labor market.  Top managers of important SOEs, 
like government officials, are evaluated and appointed by the Party.  
In this personnel system, SOE (formal) executive pay is 
benchmarked against civil servant pay and significantly lower than 
the market rates for corporate executives.  As a result, SOE 
executives have incentives to lavishly use on-duty consumption as a 
way to compensate for this difference.  The state-owner (ultimately 
the Party) has an interest in maintaining its personnel control and 
secrecy by practicing zero-pay reporting and nominal-actual pay 
gap. The Party’s retreat from SOE personnel management is the key 
to successful compensation reform of Chinese SOEs.  Unfortunately, 
at this point, the Party remains unwilling to relinquish this power.  
While in recent years the government has experimented with the 
idea of recruiting top managers from outside the state sector, this 
author’s recent empirical research shows that the executive labor 
market of China’s SOEs remains virtually closed to those who are 
outside the state system.73  Part of the reason for the absence of 
professionals recruited outside the state system is that the pay is too 
low compared to the prevailing market rate.  To handle this problem, 
the Chinese government is experimenting with a dual pay system 
for SOEs.  Under the system, the compensation of executives whose 
careers develop within the state system is unilaterally set by 
SASAC’s evaluation, while those recruited from outside are paid 
based on market rates through contract negotiation.  The latter 
                                                                                                               
 71 Id.  The chairman and CEO of the China Merchants Group received the highest pay.  
 72 SASAC disclosed the 2015 pay at the end of 2016. Its disclosure time is not 
contemporaneous with annual reporting of listed companies.  Moreover, the low executive 
pay reinforces the common belief that Chinese SOE executives do not reply on formal pay 
but other sources of income (“gray income”). 
 73 Li-Wen Lin, Balancing Closure and Openness: The Challenge of Leadership 
Reform in China’s State-Owned Enterprises, in REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND?: THE 
INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM 133 (Benjamin L. Liebman & 
Curtis J. Milhaupt eds., 2015). 
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compensation is usually much higher than the former.  It is unclear 
whether such dualism will work well—anecdotal evidence indicates 
that it can brew resentment among those whose pay is subject to 
SASAC’s relatively low pay policy.74 
C. Questions for Future Research 
The primary research methodology used in executive 
compensation literature is quantitative analysis of the compensation 
data disclosed in formal corporate reports.  The validity of this 
research approach is built on the premise that the numbers published 
on paper fairly reflect the compensation practices in effect.  This 
premise is appropriate when corporate governance institutions are 
competent and efficient.  However, it should be used with great 
caution when dealing with data regarding China, since the capital 
market remains relatively immature there.  Also as scholars of 
Chinese law commonly note, the gap between the law on the books 
and the law in action is often considerably large in China.  To be 
sure, it is unwarranted to entirely deny the credibility of information 
disclosed in the annual reports of China’s listed companies, yet it 
does reasonably suggest the limitation of statistically crunching 
numbers to understand the true practices of Chinese corporate 
governance, including executive compensation.  Future empirical 
research should conduct surveys and interviews to get deeper 
insights in order to fully understand the operation of executive 
compensation in the Chinese context. 
The findings in this Article suggest another lacuna of 
existing empirical research on Chinese executive compensation: 
business groups as a missing variable.  A Chinese-listed firm is 
often part of a business group and some studies have investigated 
how the business group structure may influence a Chinese firm’s 
financial performance and accounting behavior.75  Yet most existing 
                                                                                                               
 74 See Yangqi Quanqiu Pin Gaoguan Sicheng Laizi Xitong Nei Guoziwei Fouren 
Neiding ( ) [Forty Percent of the 
Central SOE Executives Recruited Worldwide Are from Inside the System], BEIJING NEWS 
(May 16, 2011), http://news.sohu.com/20110516/n307579006.shtml [https://perma.cc/
Y9XB-9SEF] (interviewing a SOE CEO who was offered to pay at market rate but 
declined the offer and accepted the lower pay policy because of the potential resentment 
concern). 
 75 See, e.g., Jia He et al., Business Groups in China, 22 J. CORP. FIN. 166 (2013) 
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studies of Chinese executive compensation lack the variable of 
business group and tend to treat the listed firm as a stand-alone unit.  
How the business group structure may influence Chinese executive 
compensation is an important topic to be explored.  A very recent 
study found that executive compensation of a Chinese-listed 
subsidiary is correlated with the performance and compensation of 
another listed subsidiary in the same business group.76 
Furthermore, the zero-pay phenomenon raises some specific 
questions to be investigated in the future.  For instance, does the 
lack of financial compensation really impair managers’ capability to 
satisfy their fiduciary duties?  Empirically, do companies with a 
higher percentage of zero-pay directors or supervisors on the board 
demonstrate inferior financial performance, more frequent related-
party transactions, more sanctions by securities regulators, or any 
other undesirable behavior?  Positive answers lend some support to 
the concerns about fiduciary duties while negative answers lead to 
further inquiries about any other mechanisms that may effectively 
align board members’ interests with the listed company even when 
they are not paid by the company at all. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In recent years, Chinese executive compensation has 
received considerable media and scholarly attention.  News media 
have annually broadcasted answers to questions such as who are the 
highest paid CEOs.  The academic world has heatedly debated 
whether there is an excessive pay problem.  The government has 
taken high-profile measures to slash SOE executive compensation. 
Yet, a more than two-decade-old comment on American executive 
compensation in the Harvard Business Review seems apt for the 
                                                                                                               
Group Structure and Firm Performance in Business Groups, 52 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 
1709 (2009) (discussing group structure and firm performances in China); Lisa A. Keister, 
Engineering Growth: Business Group Structure and Firm Performance in China’s 
Transition Economy, 104 AM. J. SOC. 404 (1998) (discussing the relationship between 
business group structure and firm performance in China). 
 76 Guilong Cai & Guojian Zheng, Executive Compensation in Business Groups: 
Evidence from China, 9 CHINA J. ACCOUNT. RES. 25 (2016) (finding that “when the change 
in performance of one subsidiary is lower than that of the other subsidiaries, the change in 
its executive compensation is significantly lower.  Further, when the business group is 
private and the level of marketization is high, the subsidiary’s executive compensation is 
more likely to be influenced by the performance of the other subsidiaries”). 
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current situation in China—“The relentless focus on how 
much CEOs are paid diverts public attention from the real 
problem—how CEOs are paid.”77  The “how” indeed has Chinese 
characteristics, rather than merely an issue of compensation 
composition like in the United States and elsewhere.  Understanding 
how Chinese executives are paid is a challenging task because it is 
not a matter of simply crunching the numbers released in public 
companies’ annual reports.  A valid reading of formal compensation 
figures entails an understanding of the network structure and the 
political environment in which Chinese companies operate.  An 
investigation of the actual practices behind formal compensation 
numbers emphasizes the important role of political institutions in 
executive compensation, reevaluates China’s latest SOE reform 
policy, and highlights the lacuna of extant scholarship on Chinese 
executive compensation. 
  
                                                                                                               
 77 Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You 
Pay, But How, HBR (May-June 1990), https://hbr.org/1990/05/ceo-incentives-its-not-how-
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cash compensation 
Jean Chen et al., The Effect of 
Insider Control and Global 
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GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 107 
(2010). 
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J. CORP. FIN. 1158 (2011). 
2001–
2005 
Almost all 
listed 
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